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Cohabitation and the Restatement (Third) of
Restitution & Unjust Enrichment
Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer
Abstract
The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment clarified
and modernized a field that had become muddled since the publication of
the Restatement (First) in 1937. One area of modernization relates to the
changes in law towards women, particularly changes in law toward female
cohabitants. Published in 2011, the Restatement (Third) added a new
Section 28, which rejected the view that it would be immoral for one
cohabitant to bring suit against the other, and relaxed the restriction on
recovery in unjust enrichment for “gratuitous” contributions. This Article
reviews societal and legal changes for women since 1937 and notes that, in
adding Section 28, the Restatement (Third) followed the methodology of the
Restatement (First). The Article reviews the principles of restitution and
demonstrates how Section 28 follows them. Section 28 is a welcome
addition to the law of restitution, but the author suggests that some of the
recoveries described in the illustrations are inadequate. For example,
since homemaking services do not have a market value, attempting to put a
monetary value on them tends to undervalue them. Limiting recovery to the
value of services also ignores the concept of tracing the value of one’s
contribution to an asset and recovering the enhanced value of the
asset. The name in which the assets are titled should not negate the value
of the contributions of the partner without nominal ownership. On the
other hand, some illustrations to Section 28 describe adequate remedies,
including sharing assets. The author notes the complexity inherent in
measuring value in nonmarket, nonmarriage situations, but recommends
that the illustrations with the more generous recoveries are appropriate for
avoiding the unjust enrichment of one partner.
 Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law; A.B.,
Wellesley College; J.D., Northeastern University School of Law. This project was several
years in the making. I would like to thank my Dean’s Fellows, Lucy Colby, Megan
McKinney, and Kathleen Curtis for their excellent research, and I would like to thank the
American University, Washington College of Law Research Fund for generously supporting
this project.
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I. Introduction
The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment endorses
the modern view that a partner in a marriage-like relationship may recover
in unjust enrichment from the one who left with jointly created assets. In
doing so, the Restatement (Third) is following the example of the
Restatement (First) of Restitution, which endorsed the then modern view
that a putative wife, one who thought she was married, could recover in
unjust enrichment from her "spouse." Both Restatements rejected the
reasoning of cases that denied recovery to women (usually women) because
they were in illicit, or meretricious, relationships. The Restatement (First)
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justified its rejection of this bar because the putative wife was the victim of
deception or mistake. The Restatement (Third) rejects the bar on the
ground that denying recovery to one partner can enrich the other, equally
illicit, partner. The late Professor John Dawson, a leading voice in the
articulation of the doctrine of restitution and unjust enrichment, would
approve.
The addition of Section 28, Unmarried Cohabitants, to the Restatement
(Third) is a good step toward protecting the frustrated expectations of
financially vulnerable, trusting people, some of whom raised families with
their prior "spouse." It raises many questions about the scope of relief,
however. The enriched cohabitant frequently leaves with his (usually his)
future security unchanged. His partner often may have little earned income
of her own. Section 28 has differing emphases about the value of
homemaking and helpmate services. Some Illustrations describe recoveries
that involve sharing assets created during the relationship. Illustration 11,
however, describes a woman who was an essential part of her partner’s
business and contributed ideas that helped it grow substantially. She would
only be entitled to salary for that period but not any part of the increase in
the business from her contributions (the "traceable product" from her
services).
In this Article I explain why I think Professor Dawson would approve
of the addition of Section 28, which would explicitly make restitution
available to cohabitants who live as if they were married. I describe how
the addition of Section 28 to the Restatement (Third) is consistent with the
original Restatement’s methodology and with changes in society,
particularly for women. I then describe the law of restitution and how
Section 28 fits into it. I conclude by describing various remedies illustrated
in Section 28 and the questions raised by them.
II. Section 28 and Professor Dawson
Watching the Reporter, Professor Andrew Kull, put together the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, I was impressed
by the gargantuan amount of work he did for more than ten years
researching the field. How skillfully he analyzed and drafted. How kind he
was in considering all suggestions. How painstaking he was putting
everything together to be correct and fair.
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Professor John Dawson, whose contributions to the field of restitution
and unjust enrichment were enormous,1 would be pleased. He said in his
book, Unjust Enrichment, written less than fifteen years after publication of
the Restatement (First) that "any highly developed legal system needs
restitution remedies and cannot get on without them."2 He was concerned,
however, that "the practical limitations of our own working method [makes
us] less generous than we could otherwise afford to be."3 In the fifty years
since Professor Dawson wrote Unjust Enrichment, the law of restitution has
developed substantially, enabling Professor Kull and the ALI to compile a
new Restatement that describes a modern working method for analyzing
claims in restitution.
Professor Kull sifted through more than seventy years of judicial and
scholarly analysis since the original Restatement of Restitution appeared.
He brought clarity to a field that had become muddled with inconsistency,
with an eye favoring the more modern judicial formulations. This accords
with the ALI’s expressed goal for Restatements, that they provide "clear
formulations of common law and its statutory elements or variations and
reflect the law as it presently stands or might be plausibly stated by a
court."4 Inevitably, stating "the law as it presently stands" required that
choices be made. The delicacy of the process of so "restating" the law is
well explained by Professor Doug Rendleman in his article Restating
Restitution.5 Those choices for the Restatement (Third) have been made
adroitly and fairly by Professor Kull.
III. Overview of Restitution
Just as breach of contract and tort are substantive areas providing
sources of liability, so too is restitution.6 The remedies in both contract and
1. See Candace S. Kovacic, Applying Restitution to Remedy a Discriminatory Denial
of Partnership, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 743, 770 n.115 (1983) ("In his book, Professor
Dawson discussed analytic problems in the area of restitution, but not from the point of view
that restitution should be abandoned . . . but rather that it should be better analyzed so that it
can be given wider application.").
2. JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 150 (1951).
3. Id. at 127.
4. American Law Institute, Projects, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
projects.main (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. Doug Rendleman, Restating Restitution: The Restatement Process and Its Critics,
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 933, 942–43 (2008).
6. See Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV.
1277, 1284–85 (1989).
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tort cases generally measure a plaintiff’s loss: in contract, compensation for
loss of plaintiff’s bargain; in tort, compensation for losses to a plaintiff’s
person or property. Unlike recovery in contract and tort actions, however,
recovery in restitution is not based on what a plaintiff lost; rather, it
measures what a defendant gained unjustly at a plaintiff’s expense.7 As I
wrote in 1983, "the many definitions of restitution articulated throughout
the years consistently contain the following three elements: ‘(1) the
defendant has been enriched by the receipt of a benefit; (2) the defendant’s
enrichment is at the plaintiff’s expense; and, (3) it would be unjust to allow
the defendant to retain the benefit.’"8 Besides quoting from Section 1 of the
Restatement (First) of Restitution, I referenced Dean J.B. Ames’s and
Professor William A. Kenner’s writings from the late 1800s, which listed
those three basic elements in the context of the legal action referred to as
quasi-contract.9 Recognizing that the same elements were present in the
equitable principles of constructive trust, Warren A. Seavey and Austin W.
Scott, the Reporters of the Restatement (First), put quasi-contract and
constructive trust together in that one Restatement, published in 1937.10 As
Professor Douglas Laycock said: "This was a major accomplishment; it
created the field."11 Professor Dawson recognized the potential scope of the
field. He said:
My own conclusion is that restitution remedies in our law have a roving
commission. The generalizations now built around them and the
techniques they provide have implications that reach in every direction,
in unsuspected ways. No area is marked off as exempt. We have not
7. See Kovacic, supra note 1, at 764–67; Laycock, supra note 6, at 1285–86; see also
Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property
or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 504 (1980) (stating that restitution
prevents unjust enrichment: torts repair wrongfully inflicted damage).
8. Kovacic, supra note 1, at 757–59 (citations omitted).
9. See WILLIAM A. KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS 16
(1893) ("[N]o one shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.");
J.B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 53, 64 (1888) ("Quasi-contracts are
founded . . . upon the fundamental principle of justice that no one ought unjustly to enrich
himself at the expense of another."); see also 3 FREDRICK WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASICONTRACTS 4 (1913) (stating that quasi-contracts are "legal obligations arising . . . from the
receipt of a benefit the retention of which is unjust, and requiring the obligor to make
restitution"), quoted in Kovacic, supra note 1, at 757 n.72.
10. See GRAHAM DOUTHWAITE, ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO RESTITUTION § 8.1, at 323
(1977) (noting that restitution derives from both common law and equity, both of which are
based on the principle that "recovery of a benefit should be allowed where one has received
the benefit under circumstances which render it unjust that he should retain it" (citations
omitted)), quoted in Kovacic, supra note 1, at 757 n. 72.
11. Laycock, supra note 6, at 1278.
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yet absorbed all the contributions that they made or foreseen those still
in the making.12

In contrast to Professor Dawson’s statement that restitution remedies
have a "roving commission" and "implications that reach in every
direction," some have criticized the field as too vague or broad. Some have
even quoted his comment that when "formulated as a generalization, [unjust
enrichment] has the peculiar faculty of inducing quite sober citizens to
jump right off the dock."13 In context, however, it would appear that the
statement does not suggest that restitution is a narrow field, but rather "that
it should be better analyzed so that it can be given wider application."14
Not only do critics ignore Professor Dawson’s concern that limitations
of the method of analysis of restitution limited its generosity, but they also
ignore the analyses of Judge Learned Hand and the Reporters of the
Restatement (First) of Restitution.15 Judge Hand pointed out that if unjust
enrichment is vague, so too are the concepts of the "ordinar[y] prudent
man" and "enjoyment of land."16 Reporters Seavey and Scott noted that the
concepts of "promises" in contract law and "wrong" and "harm" in tort law
are no more narrow than the concept of restitution.17 They said that what
had been required in tort and contract law was "a large number of
individual rules to determine when relief will be given," and that the same
would be required for restitution: "[A]n extensive set of individual rules to
spell out what is meant by ‘unjust.’"18 In the years since Judge Hand and
12. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 117.
13. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 8; see also, e.g., Daniel Friedmann, supra note 7, at
504–05 ("The concept of unjust enrichment is notoriously difficult to define. It has on
occasion been regarded as too indefinite and vague to be recognized as a general legal
principle . . . ." (citations omitted)); Dale A. Oesterle, 79 MICH. L. REV. 336, 337 (1980)
(reviewing G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1978)) ("Restitution is a term that
describes a variety of common law rights . . . ."); Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice:
Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 716 (2006) ("[T]he law of
restitution is both potent and poorly understood. In these circumstances, it seems
appropriate to recall Professor Dawson’s warning that when "formulated as a generalization,
[unjust enrichment] has the peculiar faculty of inducing quite sober citizens to jump right off
the dock." (citations omitted)).
14. Kovacic, supra note 1, at 770 n.115.
15. See id. at 771–72 (noting Judge Learned Hand’s defense of quasi-contract law).
For further discussion of the historical development, criticism and defense of restitution as a
cause of action, see generally id. at 761–74 and accompanying footnotes.
16. Learned Hand, Restitution or Unjust Enrichment, 11 HARV. L. REV. 249, 250
(1898).
17. Warren A. Seavey & Austin W. Scott, Restitution, 54 LAW Q. REV. 29, 36 (1938).
18. Id.
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Reporters Seavey and Scott wrote, courts have developed a large number of
individual rules to determine when relief will be given, albeit with
confusions and inconsistencies. Professor Kull was able to draw from these
rules to put together the Restatement (Third). This much needed work
should minimize if not eliminate much of the confusion about the field.
Despite the publication of the Restatement (First) in 1937, restitution
had not been well understood. "As Professor Dawson said in 1951, ‘it is
doubtful even now whether most lawyers have an adequate conception of
the range and resources of the remedy.’"19 It is doubtful whether the field is
any better understood sixty years later. Judges and lawyers have found
restitution confusing, at least in part, because the term has many synonyms,
some of which, such as "quasi-contract," create confusion with contract
law,20 and because the term at times has dual meanings as either a cause of
action or a remedy.21 In addition, some judges and lawyers view restitution
as available only if "the remedy at law is inadequate,"22 which raises the
question: Which law?
The Restatement (Third) clarifies the meaning of the many synonyms
for restitution and adds the phrase "Unjust Enrichment" to the title to
emphasize that they are overlapping topics.23 Despite the fact that they are
not always used synonymously, the Restatement (Third) uses the terms that
way, unless the context requires a distinction.24 It makes clear that because
19. Kovacic, supra note 1, at 761 (quoting DAWSON, supra note 2, at 22); see also
DOUTHWAITE, supra note 10, § 1.1, at 2 (noting that a practitioner usually does not recognize
"the restitutionary implications or potential of the problem before him"), quoted in Kovacic
supra note 1, at 761 n.90; Laycock, supra note 6, at 1277 ("Despite its importance,
restitution is a relatively neglected and underdeveloped part of the law.").
20. See Kovacic, supra note 1, at 761–63.
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch. 7, intro.
note (2011) ("The awkwardness of using the word ‘restitution’ to identify both a claim based
on unjust enrichment and the corresponding remedy means that this simple division of the
overall subject matter is not always apparent from its terminology."); see also Laycock,
supra note 6, at 1279–83 (discussing the many meanings of "restitution").
22. See CANDACE KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, JEAN LOVE AND GRANT NELSON, EQUITABLE
REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES: CASES AND MATERIALS, 547–48 (8th ed. 2010)
(identifying cases that require an adequate legal remedy before considering a restitution
claim).
23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. c
(2011) ("The title of the present Restatement incorporates both terms—not to imply that they
are correlatives, much less synonyms, but to convey as clearly and immediately as possible
an accurate idea of the overlapping topics treated herein.").
24. See id. ("When used in this Restatement to refer to a theory of liability or a body of
legal doctrine, the terms ‘restitution’ and ‘unjust enrichment’ will generally be treated as
synonymous. Any more particular meaning that the words may carry should be clear from
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restitution is a source of liability, 25 the idea that it is available only if the
remedy at law is inadequate for a different liability does not make sense.
IV. Restatement (First) of Restitution from 1937 and Restatement
(Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment from 2010 Compared
A. The Restatement (First) and Cohabitation
In 1937, when the Restatement (First) of Restitution appeared,
unmarried cohabitation was socially unacceptable. Both before and
after the appearance of the Restatement (First), courts based their
decisions to deny recovery to unmarried cohabitants on moral judgments
about "meretricious" or "illegitimate" relationships. 26 Statements in
Brown v. Tuttle,27 an early case from Maine, typified those attitudes.
There a woman, who lived with a man "as husband and wife" from 1871
to 1884, brought suit to recover money she had loaned him and payment
for her services after he left her to marry another woman. 28 In denying
recovery, the court did not discuss whether the parties had a common
law marriage or whether the woman was deceived into thinking that she
was married. Nor did the court consider who benefitted and who lost by
its decision. Refusing to imply a promise that her "husband" should
repay her loan or pay her for her services, the court said:
The parties were living together in violation of the principles of
morality and chastity, as well as of the positive law of the state; a
relation to which the court can lend no sanction. The services
rendered, as well as the money furnished, were in furtherance, and
for the continuation of that unlawful relation. The law will imply no
promise to pay for either. If there had been an express promise for
such a purpose, the court would not enforce it. 29

the context.").
25. See id. cmt. a ("The identification of unjust enrichment as an independent basis of
liability in common-law legal systems . . . was the central achievement of the 1937
Restatement of Restitution. That conception of the subject is carried forward here.").
26. See e.g., Swires v. Parsons, 5 Watts & Serg. 357, 358 (Pa. 1843) ("The evidence
establishes one of two things, either that the plaintiff and intestate were married, or that she
was living in a state of concubinage . . . . Either position is fatal to the claim for
compensation . . . .").
27. See Brown v. Tuttle, 13 A. 583 (Me. 1888).
28. Id. at 583.
29. Id. at 584.
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Similarly, shortly after the Restatement (First) appeared, the
Appellate Court in Illinois denied recovery to a female cohabitant who
sought payment for her services from her cohabitant’s estate. 30
Testimony in Usalatz v. Pleshe’s Estate 31 showed that people in the
community and decedent’s family thought that she and the decedent
were married, that the decedent referred to her as his wife, and that she
used his name. The jury found against her, however, because she knew
she was not married. The Appellate Court affirmed. The court said that
while the decedent’s conduct "was a deception upon the public," the
evidence "does not make a prima facie case of her being deceived by
any fraud of the decedent." 32 The court then held:
It is a well-settled rule that a woman who knowingly and voluntarily
lives in illicit relations with a man cannot recover on an implied
contract for services rendered him during such relationship. Not
only does the relationship as of husband and wife negative that of
master and servant, but, such cohabitation being in violation of
principles of morality and chastity, and so against public policy, the
law will not imply a promise to pay for services rendered under such
circumstances. 33

Neither court discussed the morality and chastity of the men in the
relationships.
Despite societal disapprobation of a woman who lived with a man
"in violation of the principles of morality and chastity," the Restatement
(First) of Restitution addressed cohabitation in its chapters on mistake
and fraud,34 approving the exception articulated but not applied in
Usalatz. The Restatement recommended recovery in restitution for a
putative spouse, one who thought she was married but was not because
of the fraud or mistake of the "quasi-husband."35 That was not the
30. Usalatz v. Pleshe’s Estate, 23 N.E.2d 939, 939–42 (Ill. 1939).
31. See id. at 942.
32. Id. at 941.
33. Id. at 942 (quoting Stewart v. Waterman, 123 A. 524, 526 (Vt. 1924)).
34. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION ch. 2, topic 2 (1937); id. at
ch. 7.
35. See id. § 40 reporter’s note a ("Whether or not the defendant was fraudulent, the
older cases refused recovery on an implied contract and indicated that the wife was relegated
to a tort action, usually useless because it did not survive the death of the pseudo husband as
the contract action did."); id. § 134 cmt. a, illus. 2 ("A, a married man, fraudulently purports
to marry B, who does not know that A is married. Believing that she is A’s wife, B renders
services to A. B is entitled to recover the reasonable value of her services, less the value of
benefits received by her."); see also id. § 40 cmt. b ("The rule . . . is applicable both where
the services are obtained by a consciously false statement and where they are the result of an
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unanimous view of the courts at the time, as the Reporters noted:
"[W]hether or not the defendant was fraudulent, the older cases refused
recovery on an implied contract." 36 The Reporters chose, however, to
follow those more generous later cases that "tend to allow relief in this
situation."37
B. Societal Changes Between 1937 and 2010
The "later cases" referred to in the Restatement (First) were modern
at the time. Of course, what was modern in 1937 is no longer modern.
In their note to Section 40, Reporters Seavey and Scott discussed
putative marriages only in the context of putative wives. They may well
have concluded that women, more than men, were the ones who were
hurt "in this situation," 38 particularly given the lack of employment
opportunities for women at the time.
Much has changed for women since then. Putative wives routinely
recover in unjust enrichment from their deceitful "husbands." 39 While in
1937 women had been voting for less than twenty years, today they have
been voting for almost one hundred, and women hold many elected
offices.40 In 1937 employers could pay women less than men for the
same work and could keep them out of the workplace altogether
if they so chose.41 About twenty-five years later, the Equal Pay

innocent but material misstatement. The fact that the one rendering the services does not
expect to be compensated therefor or otherwise to receive benefit is immaterial."); id. § 40
cmt. b, illus. 3 ("Mistakenly believing that he is properly divorced, A represents to B that he
is single and goes through a ceremony of marriage . . . . A becomes sick and B assumes
charge of family affairs, rendering personal service to A and supporting him by her earnings.
B is entitled to restitution.").
36. Id. § 40 reporter’s note a.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. b (2011)
(contrasting restitution available under Section 28 for a cohabitant with restitution available
under the sections of misrepresentation or mistake for a putative spouse).
40. The Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which
conferred on women the right to vote, was approved in 1920. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
41. See Claudia Goldin, Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of
American Women, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION
AND PUBLIC POLICY 17, 20 (Paul Burstein ed., 1994) (indicating that the difference between
men’s and women’s earnings throughout much of history, and to some extent today, can be
attributed to "wage discrimination").
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Act42 amendment in 1963 to the Fair Labor Standards Act43 and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited those practices.44
Prior to 1971, states could pass laws that distinguished between men
and women merely by noting that men and women are different from one
another. For example, in 1948 the United States Supreme Court upheld,
against a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, a Michigan statute that
prohibited women from working as bartenders unless they were the wife or
daughter of a male bar owner.45 Justice Frankfurter, noting that "alewives"
according to Shakespeare, were "sprightly and ribald" said:
[b]eguiling as the subject is, it need not detain us long. . . . Michigan
could, beyond question, forbid all women from working behind a
bar. This is so despite the vast changes in the social and legal position
of women. The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that
men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices
that men have long practiced, does not preclude the States from drawing
a sharp line between the sexes . . . .46

The Court held that the exception for wives and daughters was not
irrational as the Michigan legislature could have thought women bartenders
might "give rise to moral and social problems" that could be lessened by
"the oversight . . . by a barmaid’s husband or father," and that the
legislature, which did not bar women from being waitresses in bars, did not
need to address every aspect of the problem.47 Justice Rutledge for the
dissent would have held that the statute’s distinction was "invidious,"
pointing out that the male bar owner did not need to be present when his
wife or daughter tended bar.48 In 1971, however, in a case involving a state
42. See Equal Pay Act of 1963, PUB. L. NO. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1962) ("No employer
having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate . . . between
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate
less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal
work . . . .").
43. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006) (establishing minimum wage, overtime pay,
recordkeeping, and youth employment standards affecting employees in the private sector
and in Federal, State, and local governments).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) ("It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.").
45. Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465–67 (1948).
46. Id. at 465–66.
47. Id. at 466.
48. Id. at 468 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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statute preferring men over women as administrators of estates, the
Supreme Court held that laws distinguishing between men and women must
have "a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation" and not
be validated merely for administrative convenience.49
Much has also changed since 1937 in how the law regulates morality.
In most states cohabitation and adultery are no longer criminal.50
Homosexuality is no longer criminal,51 and societal views about same-sex
marriage are not uniform. The incidence of cohabitation has increased
substantially and is generally viewed with less disapproval than at the time
the Restatement (First) appeared.52 In some cases a "stay-at-home-dad" is
the complainant.53 Not all courts view the woman, solely, as the "guilty"
party. As Judge Shirley Abrahamson of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
said in In re Steffes54 in 1980: "Why should the estate be enriched when
that man was just as much a part of the illicit relationship as she."55 The
dissent in Steffes, however, was still of the view that "this court ought not to
49. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
50. See Brandon Campbell, Comment, Cohabitation Agreements in Massachusetts:
Wilcox v. Trautz Changes the Rules But Not the Results, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 485, 489
(2000) (indicating that "cohabitation was a criminal offense in Massachusetts until 1987");
Jonathan Turley, Criminal Adultery: States Ponder the Continuation of Puritanical Laws,
JONATHAN TURLEY RES IPSA LOQUITUR (Apr. 26, 2010), http://jonathanturley.org/
2010/04/26/criminal-adultery-states-ponder-the-continuation-of-puritanical-law (last visited
Oct. 5, 2011) (chronicling the history of criminal adultery statutes and states’ decisions
whether to repeal those statutes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see,
e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.30 (2004) ("Any person who shall commit adultery shall be
guilty of a felony; and when the crime is committed between a married woman and a man
who is unmarried, the man shall be guilty of adultery, and liable to the same punishment.").
51. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (invalidating the criminality
of homosexuality).
52. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 109 (Cal. 1976) (stating that in the fifteen
years since 1960 the number of cohabiting couples increased substantially); Goode v.
Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 436 (W.Va. 1990) (stating that the number of couples living
together increased substantially between 1970 and 1990); see also Terry S. Kogan,
Competing Approaches to Same-Sex Versus Opposite-Sex, Unmarried Couples in Domestic
Partnership Laws and Ordinances, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1023, 1025 n.5 (stating that
cohabitation in the United States increased 400 percent between 1980 and 2000, representing
4.1 million of the approximately 93 million U.S. households in 1997).
53. See Costa v. Oliven, 849 N.E.2d 122, 125 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (holding that a male
cohabitant who cared for the home and child was unable to recover from the female
cohabitant, in whose name property was titled because of Illinois precedent against one
cohabitant recovering from the other).
54. See In re Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 705 (Wis. 1980) (holding that there was
sufficient evidence to "support the trial court’s finding that there was an implied promise to
pay for the services plaintiff rendered").
55. Id. at 706.
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allow [plaintiff] to assert a right to compensation growing out of a
relationship which offends the standards of decency of any age."56
Some things have not changed, however. Women’s wages on average
are still less than men’s.57 Women are still more often than men the
primary caregivers at home and are still more often than men financially
hurt when a relationship ends.58 Because many couples now live in
marriage-like relationships, if laws of the past are imported to modern day,
many women will continue to be hurt.59
C. Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment
and Cohabitation
As the Restatement (Third) notes, many cases decided in the later part
of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century have
allowed one cohabitant from a terminated relationship to recover from the
other.60 Just as at the time of publication of the Restatement (First) not all
courts recognized unjust enrichment claims of putative wives,61 at the time
of publication of the Restatement (Third) not all courts recognized unjust
enrichment claims of knowingly unmarried cohabitants.62 For example, in

56. Id. at 712 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
57. See Laura Fitzpatrick, Why Do Women Still Earn Less Than Men?, TIME (Apr. 20,
2010),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1983185,00.html#ixzz1Eepcu53R
(last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (indicating that, as of 2008, the average woman only earned
seventy-seven cents for every dollar earned by a man and that the disparity is even greater
among black and Hispanic women) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
58. Diana Pearce, The Feminization of Ghetto Poverty, 21 SOCIETY 70, 70 (1983).
59. See Kogan, supra note 52, at 1027 (suggesting that extending legal recognition to
cohabiting couples embraces "fairness, tolerance, and diversity").
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 reporter’s
note a (2011) (noting twentieth and twenty-first century decisions).
61. See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text (identifying cases where putative
wives were unable to recover).
62. Section 28 applies to both homosexual and heterosexual partnerships. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 28 cmt. b ("For the purposes of this section, a ‘relationship
resembling marriage’ includes a relationship between persons of the same sex."). The fact
that women are more likely to be financially hurt when relationships end than men is not
limited to heterosexual partnerships. In a homosexual relationship it is possible for one of
the partners to assume the gendered role of "wife." Any cohabitant, man or woman, who is
the helper to his or her partner’s financial success at the expense of his or her own is
financially harmed when a relationship terminates. This Article will speak of abandoned
women, using this as a proxy for anyone who takes on a traditionally female gendered role
in the same situation.
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denying a cohabitant’s claim, a 2004 case in Illinois63 followed the
reasoning of its Supreme Court in Hewitt v. Hewitt64 from 1979. The court
in Hewitt expressed the attitude that morality should be the basis for
deciding whether or not to allow a claimant to recover. There, the plaintiff
and defendant had lived together for fifteen years, had three children, and
had represented themselves as married. The plaintiff claimed that the
defendant had promised to share everything with her and that she had
worked and borrowed money from her parents to help him with his dental
education and establishment of his periodontal practice. After their
separation, the woman brought suit. The Illinois trial court dismissed the
suit, but the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed, holding that when the
relationship is a "stable family relationship" like a marriage, the plaintiff
should be allowed to recover.65 In reinstating the trial court’s verdict,
however, the Supreme Court of Illinois wrote: "We do not intend to
suggest that plaintiff’s claims are totally devoid of merit,"66 but the court
questioned whether allowing recovery to a woman who chose "to enter into
what have heretofore been commonly referred to as ‘illicit’ or
‘meretricious’ relationships," would "encourage formation of such
relationships and weaken marriage as the foundation of our family-based
society?"67 The court did not question whether relieving Mr. Hewitt of any
responsibility when he also chose to enter into the same "illicit" or
"meretricious" relationship would encourage men to form illicit
relationships and weaken marriage.
The court in Hewitt left the parties as they were because the issue
involved matters of public policy, which the court said were the province of
the legislature. In so holding, the court said:
We are aware, of course, of the increasing judicial attention given the
individual claims of unmarried cohabitants to jointly accumulated
property, and the fact that the majority of courts considering the
question have recognized an equitable or contractual basis for
implementing the reasonable expectations of the parties unless sexual
services were the explicit consideration. . . . Of substantially greater
63. See Costa v. Oliven, 849 N.E.2d 122, 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (following Hewitt).
For background knowledge on this case see supra note 53.
64. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979) (holding "that plaintiff’s
claims are unenforceable for the reason that they contravene public policy, implicit in the
statutory scheme of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, disfavoring the
grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants").
65. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454, 460 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
66. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1211.
67. Id. at 1207.
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importance than the rights of the immediate parties is the impact of such
recognition upon our society and the institution of marriage.68

The court expressed concern that if it allowed Mrs. Hewitt to recover, its
decision could affect the laws of inheritance, wrongful death, workers’
compensation, and children’s rights, none of which were involved in Mrs.
Hewitt’s suit.69
Professor Peter Linzer has written about the consequences of rules that
deny recovery to cohabitants. Speaking of presumptions about gratuitously
provided services and meretricious relationships, he said, "One thing that
should be apparent, but isn’t to many people[,] is that both these rules are
heavily loaded against women: Women usually provide services within a
household, and the ‘meretricious relationship’ ban will almost always leave
a man with happy memories and a woman with nothing."70 To paraphrase
John Dawson then, to be fair, restitution should be given wider application
to prevent men from being unjustly enriched at the expense of women.71
V. Applicability of Section 28
The Restatement (Third) did not follow those cases that denied
recovery to knowingly unmarried cohabitants. Rather, it added Section 28,
which provides:
(1) If two persons have formerly lived together in a relationship
resembling marriage, and if one of them owns a specific asset to which
the other has made substantial, uncompensated contributions in the form
of property or services, the person making such contributions has a
claim in restitution against the owner as necessary to prevent unjust
enrichment upon the dissolution of the relationship.
(2) The rule of subsection (1) may be displaced, modified, or
supplemented by local domestic relations law. 72

By permitting one cohabitant to bring a claim in restitution against the
other at the termination of the relationship, Section 28 rejects the moralistic
approach that would have courts leave the parties as they were when they
parted ways. Section 28 comments that most jurisdictions also reject this
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Peter Linzer, Rough Justice, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 695, 705.
Kovacic, supra note 1, at 770 n.115.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 (2011).
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moralistic approach.73 It recognizes that when a court refuses to award any
of the jointly acquired but not jointly titled property to a cohabitant who has
been left without, then the cohabitant with the property has been enriched,
and unjustly so. Even when courts view people who live together without
marriage as in "meretricious" or "illicit" relationships, most modern courts
also recognize that both parties are equally complicit.74
Besides removing a total bar to recovery, Section 28 relaxes traditional
rules regarding gifts and assumptions of risk, recognizing that couples who
live in marriage-like relationships do not always deal with each other as
they would anyone else.75 Emily Sherwin has questioned the approach of
Section 28, arguing, inter alia, that the "intrinsic value of freedom and selfdetermination" weighs in favor of providing "options for couples who wish
to remain financially independent,"76 and that the parties could negotiate to
determine their rights upon a dissolution of their relationship, even if some
situations are complex: "[I]n a typical restitution case, negotiating for
payment is not necessarily a daunting prospect . . . . [F]requently all that is
needed is an off-the-rack legal arrangement such as a joint ownership or a
loan."77 Sherwin also argues that an exemplary case granting relief
rewarded a plaintiff whose position "read[s] like [a] Darwin Award for the
economically naïve,"78 and that a competent adult who chooses to make a
gift to another should not expect relief.79
I consider the Restatement preferable. When one partner is enriched at
the expense of the other, often only one of the two has "remained
financially independent." Also, the financially dependent partner, because
of the unique, intimate living arrangement, is not expecting to be treated as
73. See id. § 28 reporter’s note a (detailing jurisdictions rejecting the moralistic
approach).
74. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text (noting the rationale of modern
courts).
75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. c
(2011) ("Decisions allowing restitution under § 28 involve an implicit determination that the
contributions at issue were made on [the expectation that the donor will share in the resulting
benefits basis]—thereby distinguishing them from ordinary gifts—and that the claimant’s
expectation was justifiable."). "They rest, moreover, on an implicit determination that the
claimant should not be held to have assumed the risk that things would turn out as they
did . . . in short, that the transaction is not one that the parties should have regulated by
contract." Id.
76. Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77
U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 722 (2006).
77. Id. at 727.
78. Id. at 719 n.32.
79. Id. at 724.
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a self-sufficient roommate, but instead is financially dependent because she
was expecting to be taken care of.80 Recognizing the uniqueness of this
plight, Section 28 created rules applicable only to it, and inapplicable to
other home sharing relationships, such as nonmarriage-like intimate
relationships or those involving relatives or roommates.81
As Comment b notes: "A standard objection to restitution in related
contexts—the argument that the asserted obligation should properly have
been the subject of a contract between the parties—is ordinarily disregarded
when restitution is allowed between former cohabitants."82 Even those not
disregarding such a future contingency may believe that planning for the
end of a relationship through contract would indicate lack of trust. In
divorce cases, just division of assets is not limited to those who have signed
prenuptial agreements.83 Also, not all cohabitants who have lived together
for years, and perhaps had children together, have only simple transactions
and know where or how to find or create an appropriate legal document.
Not all asset-holding partners are willing to agree to contract, regardless of
fairness or moral duties. Thus, Section 28 recognizes that cohabitation
creates atypical restitution cases and that the law should provide appropriate
relief.
Perhaps people are not wise to assume that their marriage-like
relationships will continue, but love and intimacy do not always correlate
with wisdom. By the time wisdom is acquired in hindsight, one partner
may be unjustly enriched at the expense of the other. As the Restatement
(Third) comments, because "unjust enrichment in these cases can be
demonstrated only in retrospect" cohabitants do not assume the risk "that
things would turn out as they did."84 Rules of law that favor the wise at the
expense of the foolish may create injustice. Just as Section 90 in the
Restatements of Contracts creates an exception from some of the usual
80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. c
(2011) ("Even when a transfer between cohabitants is essentially gratuitous, it may be made
in the expectation that the donor will share, directly or indirectly, in the resulting benefits.").
81. Whether rules should be relaxed in the context of other nonbusiness-like
relationships is not addressed in this Article.
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. b (2011).
83. Cf. Eyster v. Pechenik, 887 N.E.2d 272, 279 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (holding that
prenuptial agreements require judicial scrutiny because "expectations that persons planning
to marry usually have about one another can disarm their capacity for self-protective
judgment, or their inclination to exercise it, as compared to parties negotiating commercial
agreements") (quoting PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS &
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.02 cmt. c (2002)).
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. c (2011).
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rules of contract, such as the need for consideration to make a promise
intended to induce reliance enforceable for people who reasonably, but
perhaps not wisely, did rely,85 Section 28 creates an exception from some of
the usual rules of restitution for unwise cohabitants.
Illustration 3 of Section 28 describes a scenario in which restitution is
appropriate for an enamored, presumably lonely, 56-year-old farmer who
loses everything to a woman who ends up leaving him with nothing.86 The
Restatement (Third) is concerned not with punishing naivety, but with what
should happen to one partner whose frustrated expectations of trust and
sharing enrich the other. As Section 28 recognizes, this describes a
scenario appropriate for restitution. An action that is mean-spirited and
opportunistic is unjust,87 while the just result is reimbursement of the
claimant. As Professor William A. Keener said in his 1893 treatise: "[T]he
question to be determined is not the defendant’s intention, but what in
equity and good conscience the defendant ought to do," or what a fairminded person would have done.88
Some believe that allowing a cohabitant to recover in unjust
enrichment weakens the institution of marriage.89 Unfortunately, when
remedies are denied to a financially vulnerable cohabitant because of lack
of marriage, a court is punishing only one of two cohabitants by allowing
one, not two, to be enriched. Such an unequal outcome itself might weaken
rather than strengthen the institution of marriage because it creates an
incentive for the more financially savvy partner to opt out of marriage. As
the Supreme Court of Nevada said in reversing the dismissal of a woman’s
claim: "We recognize that the state has a strong public policy interest in
encouraging legal marriage. We do not, however, believe that policy is
well served by allowing one participant in a meretricious relationship to
abscond with the bulk of the couple’s acquisitions."90
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. d, illus.
3 (2011). This illustration is based on Sharp v. Kosmalski, 351 N.E.2d 721 (1976).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 reporter’s note d
(2011).
87. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (2011)
(addressing profits derived from opportunistic breach).
88. WILLIAM A. KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS 20 (1893).
89. See, e.g., Sherwin, supra note 76, at 722 (stating that "[a]rguments in favor of a
contractual approach include . . . the possibility that legal equivalence between marriage and
cohabitation will devalue and discourage marriage").
90. Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672, 674 (Nev. 1984); see also Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So.
2d 872, 876 n.1 (Miss. 1986) ("That we may recognize other rights arising out of the marital
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VI. Uncertain Remedies Obtainable in Cohabitation Cases
A. Overview
The proposition that restitution is available to resolve cohabitation
cases has slowly gained credence over the years and is now reflected in the
Restatement (Third). The proposition that one partner should not be
allowed to "abscond with the bulk of the couple’s assets" has also gained
credence.91 The Restatement (Third) demonstrates, however, that fertile
ground for disputes still remains concerning the type of relief that should be
available upon the dissolution of a marriage-like relationship.
As discussed above, the term restitution is used to connote both a
source of liability and a remedy.92 There is a similar overlap in the term
unjust enrichment. A person who is liable in restitution is "[a] person who
is unjustly enriched at the expense of another."93 The remedy is for the
defendant to "either restore the benefit in question or its traceable product,
or else pay money in the amount necessary to eliminate unjust
enrichment."94 Thus, the unjust enrichment that creates the liability also
measures the remedy.
The substantive area of unjust enrichment is concerned with
determining what type of enrichment is unjust. Once that is determined,
measuring the enrichment involves two considerations: what caused the
enrichment and what it is worth. When the enrichment is readily
measurable, the two considerations are the same. The amount the
defendant received is the amount that the defendant owes.95 When the
enrichment is not monetary, however, such as the receipt of services, it
must be translated into money.
Measuring the value of services in cohabitation cases is particularly
difficult. Most unjust enrichment cases valuing services involve market
transactions with market prices. For example, some subcontractors, when
relationship provides no reason on principle why we should deny an equitable property
division upon dissolution of a non-marital cohabitation.").
91. Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 437 (W. Va. 1990) (quoting Hay, 678 P.2d at
674). Goode is cited in the reporter’s notes. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION &
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 reporter’s note c (2011).
92. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011).
94. Id. § 1 cmt a; see also id. § 49(1).
95. The amount may be different than received if, for example, it can be traced into
something more profitable or the defendant can claim a change of position. Both of those
possibilities raise predominantly substantive issues.
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not paid by the general contractor with whom they contracted, seek to
recover the market value of their work from the owner for whom their work
was performed. Some workers who breached a construction contract want
to recover the excess value of their work over their customer’s losses from
the breach. Some plaintiffs seek compensation for design work or
commissions based on contracts without sufficient terms or that are
unenforceable due to the statute of frauds.96 The plaintiffs may not recover
at all or may not receive all they seek, but the values generally start with a
market or contract price.
Not all services provided by one partner to another in a marriage-like
relationship are market transactions, however, and therefore they are not
easily valued. Although it is possible to measure something that does not
have a market value, such as loss of love and companionship of a parent,
lost earning capacity, and pain and anguish,97 the nature of an intimate
relationship makes determining the value of services within it particularly
difficult.98 One partner may provide services such as raising children,
keeping a home, or working alongside the other to acquire assets or build a
business. If so, the other partner probably receives money from earnings,
investments, or other sources. He may pay for living expenses and the like.
When the partners separate, how, if at all, should the assets they acquired be
divided? If instead of apportioning the assets a court orders the defendant
to pay the plaintiff the value of her services, how should they be valued, if
at all?
The difficulty in measuring unjust enrichment in marriage-like
relationships is exacerbated by the fact that the services involved are
typically the same as those performed within a marriage. Every state has
divorce laws that govern the terminations of marriage. The laws vary.
Many if not all have been criticized as being unfair to women. 99 Courts
96. See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, A Proposal to Simplify Quantum Meruit
Litigation, 35 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 547, 587–92, 607–09, 628–34 (1986) (reviewing
commercial cases in which plaintiffs are seeking to recover for their services, and in which
the courts inconsistently measure them either by the market value of the services or the
market value to the defendant).
97. See generally KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, LOVE & NELSON, supra note 22, at 459–97.
98. See Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of
Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 994 (1995) (describing the many different
theories for valuing services in the home).
99. See Alicia Brokars Kelly, Explaining Intuitions: Relating Mergers, Contribution,
and Loss in the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 185, 186–87 (2001) (identifying literature critiquing divorce laws and noting harm to
women and children from those laws).
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faced with having to adjudicate a property dispute between two people
whose lifestyle is like a marriage often question the role that divorce laws
should play.100 Should they apply? If not, do they require that the award be
less complete than a divorce settlement so that someone who is not married
does not get the protections of marriage? If so, how much less? If less,
does that mean the award is unfair? If so, then the principle underlying
liability in unjust enrichment, the very cause of action at issue, would be
compromised.
Another way divorce laws might influence cohabitation awards would
be if a judge awarded the financially vulnerable plaintiff half of everything
that the two acquired during the relationship on the ground that the person
with the property should not be able to shield assets by staying single while
acting as if married. Another way would be to try to figure out what the
financial condition of the party with assets would have been had he been
truly single and subtract the difference between that and the assets acquired.
Another is to measure the amount of involvement the financially vulnerable
partner had in the other partner’s business and to award her that percentage
of the profits. Another is to measure the value of homemaking services or
the opportunity costs of homemaking services.
Section 28 is clear that cohabitants should no longer be barred from
bringing suit on moral grounds. However, its illustrations and comments
contain some conflicts and inconsistencies about the remedies. Some
suggest that a plaintiff cannot recover the value of the traceable product of
her work; others suggest she can.101 Some suggest that helpmate services
are valued; others suggest they are not.102 The difficulty in finding a "one
size fits all" remedy for cohabitation liability is due, no doubt, to the many
competing policies surrounding compensation of non- or under-paid work
in the home or in the partner’s business.103

100. See e.g., Flood v. Kalinyaprak, 84 P.3d 27, 32 (Mont. 2004) (declining to apply
divorce principles to a partition action by an unmarried couple).
101. See infra Part VI.C (discussing title and traceable product).
102. See infra Part VI.D (discussing helpmate services).
103. See, e.g., Laura Weinrib, Note, Reconstructing Family: Constructive Trust at
Relational Dissolution, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 207, 214–232 (2002) (discussing the
competing policies implicated by questions of compensation for uncompensated domestic
labor).
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B. Remedial Provisions in the Restatement (Third)

Sections 49 through 53 of the Restatement (Third) identify a number
of options available for measuring unjust enrichment. Section 49 describes
remedies that can result from monetary as well as nonmonetary
transactions. The latter may be "difficult to measure."104 Section 49(3)
suggests five ways to quantify this hard-to-measure unjust enrichment:
value of benefit, cost to claimant, market value of benefit, price fixed by
agreement, or, in appropriate cases, recipient’s net profit. Although not
present in the black letter, some comments in Section 28 appear to suggest
that not all of the remedies from Section 49 would be available to
cohabitants, but Section 49 is not so restricted.
C. Title and Traceable Product
One of the areas in which the illustrations in Section 28 appear to
suggest contradictory results involves whether one cohabitant can recover a
share of assets titled in the other’s name. Some of the illustrations would
deny that type of recovery, while others would allow it. Title is
problematic. As early as 1957, Justice Finley of the Supreme Court of
Washington, concurring in a cohabitation case, expressed concern about the
rule that title determines ownership rights, saying that the rule "often
operates to the great advantage of the cunning and the shrewd, who wind up
with possession of the property, or title to it in their names, at the end of a
so-called meretricious relationship."105
A comment to Illustration 11, which is based on Maglica v.
Maglica,106 would appear to foreclose recovering assets. In Maglica, a
woman whose ideas and efforts helped create an immensely profitable
business was allowed to recover a salary but denied any part of the business
profits because the stock was solely in her partner’s name. Comment e to
Section 28 reads: "When a claimant under § 28 seeks restitution in respect
of services, the measure of recovery is the value of the services rendered,
not their traceable product."107
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49 cmt. d
(2011).
105. West v. Knowles, 311 P.2d 689, 692–93 (Wash. 1957) (Finley, J., concurring).
West was cited by, among other cases, Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 121 n.21 (Cal.
1976).
106. See Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Cal. Dis. Ct. App. 1998).
107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. e (2011).
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On the other hand, other illustrations support recovery based on shared
assets. For example, under Illustration 1, a woman is entitled to an
equitable distribution of property titled only in the man’s name because,
despite earning less, her services to the family equalized their
contributions.108 Illustration 5 notes that title to a house in one partner’s
name does not prohibit division of its sale proceeds.109
These inconsistencies raise the question whether there should be a
significant difference between businesses and houses.
1. No Recovery Based on Enhanced Value of Acquired Assets
Illustration 11 is based on both Carney v. Hansell110 and Maglica. In
Carney, Joann Carney and Christopher Hansell lived together for sixteen
and a half years after Carney learned that she was pregnant. She took care
of the house and child and was "deeply involved" in Hansell’s towing
business. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, noted that
"[t]he business was built from the ground up and both parties contributed
substantially to its success."111 For the first eight years she received no
compensation for her work in the business. For the remainder of their time
together, at her insistence, she received a minimal salary. In addition, she,
along with her family, helped gut and renovate an old house that
defendant’s parents bought and titled in his name.
The court would not award Carney "a percentage of the value of the
business" because the legal requirements for a partnership, such as shared
profits and ownership of assets, were lacking.112 Hansell also had told
Carney that "he would burn the business down before she would ever get
anything."113
The court did hold that Carney was entitled to recover, at minimum
wage rates, for the time she had worked in the business, even though "as a
key employee to the business, there is no doubt her services were worth
more than minimum wage, but applying another standard would be
speculation not supported by the record."114 The court denied her any
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Illustration 1 is based on Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872 (Miss. 1986).
Illustration 5 is based on Pederson v. Anibas, 247 Wis. 2d 990 (Ct. App. 2001).
See Carney v. Hansell, 831 A.2d 128, 135 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2003).
Id. at 131.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 136
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further recovery. First the court denied Carney any division of the real
estate properties because "she did not contribute capital to the purchase of
the parcels [and] has no contractual claim to the properties [and] she and
defendant are not married."115 Second, the court said:
There is a separation between plaintiff’s role as home maker, mother
and housemate, and her role as a key employee of the business. As to
the former role as homemaker, claims for compensation for services
rendered must fail, as she received the benefit of the bargain of her
relationship with defendant. He provided for her support and those
expenses which he approved, for as long as she resided with him. 116

When Carney eventually did leave Hansell, she moved in with her
mother with only her personal belongings and a small disability income.
Hansell retained the business. One would think that the court could have
awarded Carney the same salary or other compensation as Hansell. The
court said: "There is no question that she was instrumental in assisting
defendant in building his business and in helping it grow."117 Or the court
could have attempted some approximation of the market value of Carney’s
contribution to the business.
In Maglica, Anthony and Clare lived together for twenty years as
husband and wife.118 Mr. Maglica had owned a machine shop business
since the 1950s. When Anthony and Clare began living together "they
worked side by side to build the business," which began manufacturing
flashlights.119 They had equal salaries.120 "Thanks in part to some great
ideas and hard work on Claire’s part (e.g., coming out with a purse-sized
flashlight in colors), the business boomed."121 By the time of their

115. Id. at 136–37.
116. Id. at 135.
117. Id. at 134.
118. Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 103 (Cal. Dis. Ct. App. 1998).
119. Id.
120. Id. The hypothetical in Illustration 11 has both partners having been paid below
market salaries. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28
cmt. e., illus. 11 (2011) ("Salaries paid to both parties by the corporation were artificially
low . . . ."). Maglica does not discuss whether the salaries in that case were below market or
not. Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 103 (Cal. Dis. Ct. App. 1998). Illustration 11
would provide the partner without title to stock the difference between the market rate of her
work and the salary she received, unless she could prove a contract to share the business or
that her partner had defrauded her.
121. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103.
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separation, the business, Mag Instrument, Inc., was worth "hundreds of
millions of dollars."122
When the business was incorporated "all shares went into Anthony’s
name."123 Clare and Anthony parted after Clare learned that he was
transferring the stock to his children, but not to her. She brought suit. The
jury awarded her $84 million in unjust enrichment.124 The California
Appellate Court reversed, however, holding that because she was not an
equity partner, she was not entitled to the product of her work, but only the
reasonable value of her services. The Appellate Court said: "It is one thing
to require that the defendant be benefited by services, it is quite another to
measure the reasonable value of those services by the value by which the
defendant was ‘benefited’ as a result of them. . . . ," [and a] "resulting
benefit is an open-ended standard, which . . . can result in the plaintiff
obtaining recovery amounting to de facto ownership in a business all out of
reasonable relation to the value of services rendered."125 Given that the
court had credited Mrs. Maglica’s "great ideas and hard work"126 to the
business’ success, it is hard to see why $84 million out of "hundreds of
millions of dollars"127 was "all out of reasonable relation to the value of
services rendered."128
The outcomes of Carey and Maglica may be appropriate for business
colleagues. Those working together would most likely not enter into an
arrangement whereby one owned the business and the other, despite
working as a partner, was content with a salary. More likely, they would
negotiate an express contract for a partnership or other sharing
arrangement. Even if they did not, the scope of the relationship between
the two would probably not be unspoken.
Section 28 is premised on the fact that cohabitants are not in a business
relationship and that business rules are therefore inapplicable.129 If
122. Id.
123. Id. The court’s use of the passive voice makes it impossible for the reader to know
who initiated the titling of the stock, but one can surmise.
124. Id.
125. Id. (emphasis in original).
126. Id. at 103.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 105.
129. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. b
(2011) ("A standard objection to restitution in related contexts—the argument that the
asserted obligation should properly have been the subject of a contract between the parties—
is ordinarily disregarded when restitution is allowed between former cohabitants.").
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cohabitants were dealing with someone other than their partner, they could
be viewed as having assumed the risk that their labor would benefit
someone else. In the context of a terminated marriage-like relationship,
however, what might appear donative can become "an interrupted exchange
or a conditional gift" and what might appear appropriate for a contract is
not always viewed as contractual.130 Lack of a contract does not mean,
therefore, as implied by Carey and Maglica, that the non-owner cohabitant
would have expected to be cut out of the business at any time, with only a
salary for services, but not any of the traceable results of her work.
The rationale of Illustration 11 is that restitution for services
performed by a cohabitant should be the services’ value and "not their
traceable product" because "restitution regards the defendant in such
circumstances as the innocent recipient of a noncontractual transfer, not as a
wrongdoer. Liability is accordingly for the value of benefits received, not
for their potentially more valuable product (a form of consequential
gain)."131
The premise that Christopher Hansell and Anthony Maglica were
"innocent recipients of noncontractual transfers" is not persuasive. Hansell
and Maglica knew they were accepting their partners’ services and were
refusing to provide their partners with a share in the businesses. There is no
compelling reason why the "value" of services is only the hourly wage or
salary that would attend an employee’s doing them, particularly if the
partner’s activities are of an inventive or capital-producing nature. Hansell
took advantage of Carney’s needy predicament to make her choose between
leaving with nothing or staying with food and shelter for herself and their
son.132 Anthony Maglica never informed Clare that she had no ownership
stake in the business to which she contributed "some great ideas and hard
work."133
Some cases cited in the Reporter’s Notes to Section 28 take a different
road to relief: They suggest that Christoper Hansell, Anthony Maglica, and
others like them should be estopped from claiming ownership of all of the
proceeds of joint efforts. One court awarded an equitable distribution of
property, saying:
Where, as here, the man accepted the benefit of such services, he will not
be heard to argue that he did not need them and that their economic value
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. § 28 cmt. e.
Carney v. Hansell, 831 A.2d 128, 132–34 (N.J. 2003)
Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 103 (Cal. Dis. Ct. App. 1998).
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should not be considered as the woman’s economic contributions to the
joint accumulation of property between them.134

Similarly another case cited in the Reporter’s Notes stated that one cannot be
enriched by an unrequested benefit when one could have declined its
receipt,135 and that:
It would be unjust for [one party] to assert in one breath that [the other
party] can in no way be presumed to be his [spouse] for purposes of either
the dissolution of marriage statutes or the concept of putative spouse and
to assert in another the presumption that she rendered her services
voluntarily and gratuitously.136

Section 52 of the Restatement (Third) recognizes that a recipient can be
responsible for his enrichment even though he is not a conscious
wrongdoer.137 In such case he "may be subject to a greater liability in
restitution than an innocent recipient."138
Limiting a plaintiff’s recovery only to the value of her services would
appear to be inconsistent with one of the options under Section 49(3), which
says that enrichment can be measured by "the value of the benefit in
advancing the purposes of the defendant."139 If one’s services increase the
value of assets that are titled in the other’s name, then it would appear that the
services "advanced the purposes" of that partner. The limitation against
recovering the "traceable product" of the services found in Illustration 11 also
appears to be inconsistent with other illustrations to Section 28.140
2. Recovery Based on Value from Acquired Assets
Other illustrations in Section 28 describe remedies that appear
inconsistent with the limitation of Illustration 11. For example, Illustration 1 is

134. Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 876 (Miss. 1986); see also infra Part VI.C.2
(discussing Pickens).
135. See Turner v. Freed, 792 N.E.2d 947, 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
136. Id. at 950 n.3 (brackets in original) (quoting Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325,
1332 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)).
137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 52 (2011)
("A defendant who is not a conscious wrongdoer may nevertheless be responsible for
receiving, retaining, or dealing with the benefits that are the subject of a restitution claim."
(internal cross reference omitted)).
138. Id.
139. Id. § 49(3)(a).
140. See id. § 28 cmt. e., illus. 11. See generally id.§ 28.
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based on Pickens v. Pickens.141 There, a couple divorced after having been
married for fourteen years and having had five children. A year after their
divorce, they began living together but did not remarry. They stayed together
for another twenty years and had two more children. After their final
separation the trial court ordered an "equitable distribution" of the property
based on unjust enrichment, not the laws of divorce.142 The trial court found
that Mr. and Mrs. Pickens contributed equally to the family and accumulation
of property even though Mr. Pickens earned more than Mrs. Pickens. The
court said that despite the disparity of earnings, "she did the housework, and in
my judgment the two [Pickens] were equal in their contributions to the ongoing
of the family and the accumulation of the portion of the property now
owned."143
Similarly, the court in Pederson v. Anibas,144 on which Illustration 5 is
based,145 held that although a log cabin was titled only in the man’s name, the
woman was entitled to half of the proceeds of its sale.146 It said that her
payments for some household expenses "freed up his earnings" so he could buy
the land, and that her work doing "the majority of cooking, laundry and
household chores . . . free[d] up time" for him to work on building the cabin.147
Additionally the court found that she fed the workers and helped grind logs.148
D. Helpmate Services
1. Valuable or Not
If unjust enrichment is measured by the value of services instead of the
value of the product, then a court will need to decide which services to
compensate and how to value them. Both the "which" and "how" are difficult
to determine when the services are provided to help and take care of one’s
partner and children, if any.

141.
142.
143.
144.
2001).
145.
5 (2011)
146.
147.
148.

See Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872 (Miss. 1986).
Id. at 875.
Id. at 874.
See Penderson v. Anibas, No. 00-2940, 2001 WL 969176 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 28,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. d, illus.
See Penderson, 2001 WL 969176, at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id.
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As in Pickens and Pederson, the plaintiffs in many cohabitation cases
are women who perform domestic and other helpmate services, to their
economic disadvantage. In both of those cases, the courts divided the
property between the partners. Despite those cases, Section 28 discusses
the relevance of "domestic services" in two different comments with
differing emphases. One appears to allow division of cohabitants’ assets
based on the "domestic services" of one of the partners while the other does
not. Comment c to Section 28 notes that assets may be divided "when the
equities favoring the claimant are sufficiently compelling . . . even where
the claimant’s contribution consists primarily of domestic services . . . ."149
Comment d, however, states that the type of contributions that aid in the
creation of an asset do not need to be "of any particular kind," but that
claims "based purely on domestic services are less likely to succeed,
because services of this character tend to be classified among the reciprocal
contributions normally exchanged between cohabitants whether married or
not."150
Comment d’s analogy to marriage is unfortunate. Reciprocal services
exchanged between spouses do not lack value, nor are spouses unprotected
in the case of separation. Divorce laws do not allow one spouse to keep all
of the assets when the parties separate, even when the other has performed
"purely" domestic services.151 Separating spouses have other protections.
While people who have not worked for a salary are not covered by Social
Security and therefore not eligible for disability or retirement benefits, a
spouse is eligible for those benefits derivatively on the basis of her
husband’s salary whether or not she had earned income.152 Someone
divorced after having been married ten years or more has the same
protections.153 No matter how long someone lives in a marriage-like

149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. c
(2011).
150. Id. § 28 cmt. d.
151. Many criticize divorce laws as inadequately protecting the more financially
vulnerable spouse. See generally, e.g., Kelly, supra note 99. That, however, is not a reason
to avoid adequate remedies to cohabitants. It may well be a reason to change the divorce
laws.
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2006) (providing that a spouse can recover old age,
disability, or surviving child benefits that derive from his or her spouse’s eligibility for
social security benefits from his or her employment).
153. See id. (providing that divorced spouses are similarly entitled to those benefits if
they were married ten years or more and had not remarried).
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relationship, however, that person will not have any access to Social
Security benefits except on the basis of her own earnings, if any.154
Disallowing recovery for purely domestic services ignores the concept
of comparative advantage where people, like countries, divide services or
production of goods between them based on their respective abilities and
then exchange their services or goods to maximize efficiency. In cases of
intimate relationships, a couple may allocate duties so that one is the
primary earner while the other is the primary homemaker. This allocation
may be based on comparative abilities, or, often, based on cultural norms.155
In awarding an equitable division of property between the Pickens, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi said:
As any freshman economics student knows, services and in kind
contributions have an economic value as real as cash contributions. In
such situations, where one party to the relationship acts without
compensation to perform work or render services to a business
enterprise or performs work or services generally regarded as domestic
in nature, these are nevertheless economic contributions. 156

While Mrs. Pickens contributed some earnings to the household, nothing in
the Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion indicated that Mrs. Pickens would
not have recovered if she had performed only homemaking services.
2. Offsets
As the Supreme Court of Mississippi noted in Pickens, services in kind
and services for money are both economic contributions. Thus, both
contribute to the household’s acquisition of wealth. Carney, discussed
above, held to the contrary using an offset method.157

154. See generally Laura C. Bornstein, Homemakers and Social Security: Giving
Credits Where Credits are Due, 24 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 255 (2009). Bornstein
advocates for Social Security reform for "homemakers." See generally id.
155. Judge Posner has said that women are paid less than men because they spend more
time with their children, and that if wages for traditionally male jobs are depressed and those
for traditionally female jobs are inflated, then "[l]abor will be allocated less efficiently." Am.
Nurses’ Ass’n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 719–20 (7th Cir. 1986). His premise seems to be
that it is more efficient for women rather than men to care for children.
156. Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 876 (Miss. 1986); see also supra Part VI.C.2
(discussing Pickens).
157. Supra notes 110–20 and accompanying text.
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A case similar to Carney is cited in the Reporter’s Notes to support
Illustration 2.158 Illustration 2, based on Mitchell v. Moore,159 describes a
case in which the offset method is appropriately used based on the facts
given. There, male partners are both fully employed, but one also performs
unsalaried work in the other’s home and business while supported by the
other. Illustration 2 says, "benefits conferred . . . in the course of the
parties’ relationship were adequately compensated by benefits received." 160
Given that both work full time, it would appear that neither is dependent on
the other. Nothing in the facts indicates that the one performing unsalaried
work during his spare time was worse off than if he had not been in the
relationship. Nor does it appear that the other was better off.
Many cohabitants are not financially dependent upon the other. So
long as neither sacrifices that independence to care for the other, whatever
contributions made between them most likely do set each other off. But
what of Joann Carney? Is she in the same position as the fully employed
man who performed unsalaried work for his partner in exchange for
support? She was totally dependent upon Christopher Hansell. Assuming
she had not worked in the business, but just took care of Hansell, the home,
and the child, is justice served when Hansell is able to leave her with
nothing on the theory that she had been supported by him while she was
with him? She must move in with her mother with nothing but a small
disability income and a few possessions: He keeps the house and all
income and assets acquired during the time of their cohabitation. Has he
been unjustly enriched?
Drawing the line between Mitchell v. Moore and Carney v. Hansell is
not easy, but that does not mean it should not be drawn. The following
case, Tarry v. Stewart,161 cited in support of Illustration 2, would seem to be
on the other side of the line from Mitchell, and much more like Carney.
Tarry held that the defendant, Don Stewart, had not been unjustly enriched
when he kept the proceeds from the sale of a house that he had bought.
Despite noting that both he and the plaintiff, Linda Tarry, had made
"substantial improvements"162 and that "as a result of the repairs . . . Stewart
158. Tarry v. Stewart, 649 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio Ct. App 1994).
159. See Mitchell v. Moore, 729 A.2d 1200, 1206 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (finding that
former life partner of farm owner brought action against owner, with whom partner lived for
thirteen years was not entitled to damages for unjust enrichment).
160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. c, illus.
2 (2011).
161. See Tarry v. Stewart, 649 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
162. Id. at 2.
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realized a financial benefit when the property was sold."163 Stewart was not
unjustly enriched, the court held, because both parties "enjoyed the
improvements made to the house" in the five years they lived there.164
In addition the court held Stewart was not justly enriched in any
manner. Stewart and Tarry had lived together for fourteen years and had a
child three years into their relationship. Neither had any assets when they
began living together. Tarry stopped working until the child was in school.
Then she "finished her education and began work as a medical
laboratory technician."165 According to the court the defendant supported
Tarry and their child until he left in 1989, when the child was eleven.166
Stewart and Tarry had pooled their resources for expenses by keeping
their money in a drawer to use as needed. The court did not award Tarry
any of the assets acquired during their cohabitation, however, because there
was no evidence
specifically indicating that she paid for assets that Stewart now has. To
the contrary, she has only asserted that her contribution to household
expenses "freed funds to be used in purchasing various assets," and that
she contributed to the increased value of both the Ninth Street and
Eastern Heights residences by "investing sweat equity."167

When Stewart left, Tarry had $710.30 in addition to her salary.168 She
started working as a medical technician a few years before their relationship
ended.169 She also had a car and a little furniture, all of which she had had
before she and Stewart began living together.170 Had they not met,
presumably she would have continued working, accruing a salary and social
security benefits. Because they met, they both had a child, but she was the
one who stopped working, not he.
According to the court’s analysis, both Tarry and Stewart enjoyed the
improvements to the house when they were together. If she and he had the
same enjoyment, why is he and not she entitled to the value of the
163. Id. at 5.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2.
166. Id. There was evidence that Tarry supported Stewart during their last year
together, but the court did not address that.
167. Id. at 4. The holding that merely freeing up funds for one partner to buy assets
does not entitle the other to any property interest in the assets is contrary to the holding in
Pickens v. Pickens.
168. Id. at 4.
169. Id. at 2.
170. Id. at 3.
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improvements? Unlike Mitchell v. Moore, it would appear that Tarry is
financially worse off than if she had not begun living with Stewart.
Cases involving a lot of money, particularly if they also involve
celebrities, tend to be resolved on the basis that the life style during the
relationship offset any costs to the less wealthy partner. Marvin v.
Marvin171 was such a case. Many courts cite this case, which was brought
against actor Lee Marvin, as a leading case for the proposition that one
cohabitant can bring suit against another. What many people do not know
is that when that case reached its conclusion, Michelle Marvin recovered
nothing, leaving her in the same position as if the California Supreme Court
had affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of her case as meretricious.172
Michelle Marvin had claimed that when she moved in with Lee
Marvin, at his request and with his promise to always support her, she gave
up her career to make a home for him. When the relationship terminated,
she brought suit under theories of contract and unjust enrichment. After the
California Supreme Court reinstated the case, the trial court on remand
found that Michelle was unlikely to be able to return to her prior singing
career. The court held that "plaintiff was in need of rehabilitation" and
awarded her $104,000 "to accomplish such rehabilitation in two years." 173
The court of appeal, with one judge dissenting, reversed. It held that there
was no authority for an award of "rehabilitation pay."174 The court noted
that the Marvins had no agreement to combine assets or share wealth. It
held that Lee was not unjustly enriched by Michelle’s services because
"plaintiff actually benefited economically and socially from the
cohabitation of the parties."175
Although the trial court found Michelle "in need," there was no
discussion of the facts surrounding the need. The California Supreme Court
noted that the trial court had found that Lee had given Michelle substantial
gifts,176 but there were no findings as to what remained of the gifts after the
relationship ended. The court did not discuss whether Michelle's economic
171. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). Marvin is known as the
"palimony" case, but courts do not award the equivalent of alimony to an unmarried partner,
nor did plaintiff in Marvin receive support.
172. See generally Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Cal. App. 1981).
173. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 557. The trial court also found that Lee tried to "launch"
Michelle in a recording career and to help her "continue" her nightclub singing career. Id. at
557 n.3. Regardless of his attempts, the trial court found that she was "in need." Id. at 557.
174. Id. at 577.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 558.
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benefit during the cohabitation would provide any security after the end of
the relationship. Were both Lee and Michelle living the good life, with
only Lee having money for the future?
There is a danger that the outcome of a case resolved under this theory
of "you had a good life" not only leaves the plaintiff with the same outcome
as if her case had been dismissed because of her meretricious life, but it
also appears to describe a meretricious relationship. It effectively says that
the man is not unjustly enriched because he had "paid for her services."
Further consideration of where the less wealthy cohabitant would have been
if she had not been living with her former partner and further consideration
of the less wealthy cohabitant’s current economic status might shed some
light on whether losses can be offset by the life style.
3. Measuring Value
If enrichment is not measured with reference to acquired assets, then it
will be measured by the value of the services. As the sections above
indicate, finding the value of services is difficult. Section 49(3) identifies
"market value of the benefit" as one of five options for measuring
enrichment.177 Section 28 suggests that services should be measured by
"the value of the services rendered,"178 with no reference to any market. If
there is no market to use to value the services, then perhaps another one of
the Section 49(3) options could be used. Section 49(3) identifies "cost to
claimant" as one way to measure the value of services.179
Costs can include measuring the value of goods and services, but costs
can also include foregone opportunities—opportunity costs as economists
label them. In most commercial transactions, the reasonable market value
of services can also be viewed as a measurement of opportunity costs. If it
were more productive to provide the services in a more opportune manner,
an efficient business person would seek out that opportunity.
Services performed during cohabitation are not based on economic
efficiencies, however. When a relationship turns out not as expected, and
one partner leaves with a disproportionate share of the assets, that person
has been benefited by the value of the services of the less affluent partner.
Loss of opportunity costs might reflect the actual value of the services, but

177.
178.
179.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49(3) (2011).
Id. § 28 cmt. e.
Id. § 49(3)(b).
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that might be no easier to value than services generally.180 Where would
the plaintiff be if she had not stopped working to care for a home? Where
would a plaintiff be if she spent $100,000 on her education instead of her
partner’s? How would she have protected her future if she had not
expected to be supported, often based on assurances by her partner? How
important to the calculation is the length of the relationship?
While some might argue that measuring opportunity costs is
speculative, so too is putting any monetary value on domestic services. A
remedy is not speculative just because the amount of damage is not easily
measurable. Many cases involve recovery where the amount is difficult to
measure. In particular, through wrongful death suits the survivors may
recover lost earnings of someone killed early in life.181 A remedy is only
speculative if the fact of damage is uncertain. If one partner accepts the
domestic services of the other, that partner is unjustly enriched by those
services, so the fact of damage is clear.182
VII. Conclusion
While financially vulnerable cohabitants may have a contract with
their partner to share assets if the relationship should terminate, many do
not, as Section 28 recognizes.183 Without a contract or state laws favoring
recovery for cohabitants, the only protection that the partner without assets
has is the law of restitution. Without it, the one with title to the assets that
were acquired during the relationship could leave the other who provided
domestic services or services directly increasing the value of the assets with
nothing or next to nothing and with no security for the future. The
inclusion of Section 28 in the Restatement (Third) is an appropriate
recognition that barriers to one cohabitant bringing suit against another
have been or should be eroded. Section 28 also reveals the complexity in
measuring the remedies. Difficulty in measuring those remedies, however,
180. See Estin, supra note 98, at 1006–14 (discussing opportunity costs as part of
measuring human capital).
181. See, e.g., Baird v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 349 N.E.2d 413, 418
(Ill. 1976) (upholding damages awarded for wrongful death of teens based on economic
testimony).
182. KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, LOVE & NELSON, supra note 22, at 327–36.
183. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. b
(2011) ("A standard objection to restitution in related contexts—the argument that the
asserted obligation should properly have been the subject of a contract between the parties—
is ordinarily disregarded when restitution is allowed between former cohabitants.").
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should not justify backsliding to the result of the "meretricious" relationship
cases or rendering hollow Section 28’s recognition of a restitution claim in
cohabitation disputes.

